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UNSUSTAINABLE POLICIES AND THE
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE
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HUQ ***
As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing
and its crime-control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new
focal point of concern. But satisfaction with ordinary police practices hides
deep problems. The time is therefore ripe for rethinking the assumptions
that have guided American police for most of the past two decades. This
Article proposes an empirically-grounded shift to what we call a
procedural justice model of policing. When law enforcement moves toward
this approach, it can be more effective at lower cost and without the
negative side effects that currently hamper responses to terrorism and
conventional crime. This Article describes the procedural justice model,
explains its theoretical and empirical foundations, and discusses its policy
implications, both for ordinary policing and for efforts to combat
international terrorism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing
and its crime control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new
focal point of public concern. But the apparent satisfaction with ordinary
police practices hides deep problems.
Public order successes have been achieved at great cost to politically
powerless communities. As the controversy surrounding the recent arrest of
Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates illustrated, 1 our laws and the way
they are enforced have resulted in public attitudes sharply polarized along
racial lines, 2 a division that is scarcely surprising in a nation marked by
conspicuous racial disparities in its prison populations. 3 And the costs of
current strategic choices are no longer confined to minorities and the poor.
Through its criminogenic impact, imprisonment has cross-cutting effects for
the wider population, promising safety through deterrence at the same time
as it increases victimization at the hands of former inmates. 4 These costs
are compounded by fiscal consequences that are now impossible to ignore.
In California, reliance on long-term imprisonment as a crime-control
1

Gates was arrested at his Cambridge home by a police officer who suspected him of a
house break-in. Though circumstances were disputed, many whites assumed the officer
would not have acted without good reason, while others (especially blacks) found it unlikely
that a middle-aged professor, standing on the porch of his own home, would have been
viewed with suspicion and then arrested if he had been white. See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW
COMM., MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE
CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 16–21 (June 2010) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE REVIEW
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.cambridgema.gov/CityOfCambridge_Content/
documents/Cambridge Review_FINAL.pdf; Cambridge Police Dep’t, Incident Report
# 9005127, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.samefacts.com/archives/
Police report on Gates arrest.PDF (detailing the officer’s account); Dayo Olopade, Skip
Gates
Speaks,
ROOT
(July
21,
2009),
http://www.theroot.com/views/
skip-gates-speaks?page=0,1 (for Gates’s view).
2
In one careful survey, less than twenty percent of African Americans considered the
American legal system fair. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CALIF. L. REV.
1219, 1247 (2000). After President Obama criticized the officer’s actions, a poll found that
twice as many whites as blacks disapproved of the President’s comments. See PEW
RESEARCH CTR., OBAMA’S RATINGS SLIDE ACROSS THE BOARD 15–17 (2009), available at
http://people-press.org/report/532/obamas-ratings-slide. Similar findings recur throughout
the literature.
3
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (rev. ed. 2006).
4
See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *84
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“[T]he state’s continued failure to address the severe crowding in
California’s prisons would perpetuate a criminogenic prison system that itself threatens
public safety.”), appeal docketed sub nom Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413 (2010);
Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration
in New York City Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551, 1554 (2003).
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strategy has choked off funds for education and pushed the state to the brink
of insolvency. 5 Budget imperatives are forcing the state to reduce its prison
population by 6,500 inmates, even in the face of recidivism rates of nearly
40%, among the highest in the nation.6 One prisoner brought home the
dilemma and triggered widespread alarm when he was released early but
then promptly re-arrested for attempted rape.7 In other places, incarceration
policies generate fiscal burdens that, if less dire, are nonetheless patently
unsustainable. 8 Highly stretched police forces from New York City to
Tulsa, Oakland, Los Angeles, and elsewhere are facing cuts in personnel,
even in their high priority units. 9
The pressures have become especially acute because we can no longer
subordinate conventional law enforcement to the newer preoccupation with
terrorism. That domain was long seen as far removed from everyday
policing. But government measures in this once-distant arena increasingly
intersect with local efforts to control ordinary crime. 10 And, as we discuss

5

See, e.g., Wyatt Buchanan, Has the Golden State Gone Bankrupt?, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-02-22/news/
22,
2010,
at
A1,
available
at
17950763_1_bankruptcy-treasurer-bill-lockyer-golden-state; Larry Gordon, Gale Holland &
Mitchell Landsberg, Lowered Expectations for Model of Higher Education, L.A. TIMES, July
31, 2009, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/31/local/me-college-cuts31.
6
Randal C. Archibold, Driven to a Fiscal Brink, A State Throws Open The Doors to Its
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A14. In a 2005 analysis, the three-year recidivism
rate for California offenders released from incarceration and returned to prison or jail after
conviction for new crimes was 37%. An additional 32% of released offenders were returned
to custody for technical parole violations. See Ryan G. Fischer, Are California’s Recidivism
Rates Really the Highest in the Nation? It Depends on What Measure of Recidivism You
Use, THE BULLETIN, UC Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections, Sept. 2005, at 2,
available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/bulletin_2005_vol-1_is-1.pdf.
7
Archibold, supra note 6, at A14.
8
See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, Laws Loosen to Free Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009,
at A20 (discussing states where cost constraints have forced prison releases; Kentucky
granted early release to 3,000 inmates).
9
See, e.g., Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Killed Terrorism Unit, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at
AA3; Maya Rao, N.J. Layoffs Grow in Public Sector, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 13, 2010, at
B04 (describing police force cuts in New Jersey); Nicole Marshall, TPD Making Fewer
Arrests, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1 (describing layoffs of 124 Tulsa police
officers); Bobby White, Cuts to Police Force Test a Safer Oakland, WALL ST. J., July 11,
2009, at A4 (describing decision to lay off nearly 20% of Oakland police force and similar
cuts throughout California and other states); cf. David W. Chen & Javier C. Hernandez,
Putting Blame on Albany, Mayor Unveils Budget With Heavy Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2010, at A22 (describing a budget-driven plan to cut 892 police officers, later reversed—at
the expense of teachers and other city employees—after the failed Times Square bombing
plot); David Seifman & Dan Mangan, A Cop Priority Thanks to Thug—NYPD Spared
Slashes After Terrorist Bust, N.Y. POST, May 6, 2010, at 4 (same).
10
See TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (David Weisburd
et al. eds., 2009); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law
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below, the local policing practices currently favored in much of America
not only have hidden costs for effective crime prevention but also can
directly undermine sound responses to the threat of terrorism.
The time is ripe, therefore, for rethinking the assumptions that have
guided American police for most of the past two decades. Zero-tolerance
policies and the order-maintenance model, as well as their various cousins,
for all of their apparent success must be reoriented to make room for
different priorities. We see no need for a radical restructuring of the police
function, but what we propose is nonetheless a significant shift in emphasis,
a shift to what we call a procedural justice model of policing.
The procedural justice approach is grounded in empirical research
demonstrating that compliance with the law and willingness to cooperate
with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or
the fear of consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ beliefs that
law enforcement agencies are legitimate. And that belief in turn is shaped
by the extent to which police behavior displays the attributes of procedural
justice—practices, described in more detail below, which generate
confidence that policies are formulated and applied fairly so that, regardless
of material outcomes, people believe they are treated respectfully and
without discrimination. When policing approaches the procedural justice
model, law enforcement can be even more effective at lower cost and
without the negative side effects that currently hamper our responses to
international terrorism. Indeed, the procedural justice model has direct
relevance for the development of successful strategies within that domain
itself.
In Part II of this Article, we situate the procedural justice approach by
reviewing the principles that inform the police function and the ways they
have changed over recent decades. Part III describes the procedural justice
model and explains its theoretical and empirical foundations. Part IV
focuses on concrete policy implications for ordinary policing and for efforts
to combat international terrorism. Part V offers concluding thoughts.
II. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE FUNCTION
A. GOALS AND PRINCIPLES

From their beginnings in the early 1800s and for more than a century
thereafter, urban police in America were a politically attuned branch of
municipal government, charged not only with preserving order but also with
relaying citizen requests for city services and delivering benefits to
Enforcement and Counter-terrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 385–
91 (2009).
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constituents at the precinct and ward levels.11 As American cities
mushroomed in size and density and as local political machines flourished,
the police, deeply engaged in collecting and distributing patronage,
occasionally brutal and often corrupt, became an indispensable arm of the
ruling establishment. 12 The title of one scholarly study summed it up:
Police: Streetcorner Politicians. 13 The dilemma of “law enforcement in a
democratic society” 14—the need not only to endow officials with authority
to deploy deadly force but also to preserve democratic control—precipitated
a “preoccupation with legitimacy.” 15
The solution that began to emerge in the 1950s, prominently endorsed
in 1967 by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, was professionalization. 16 Henceforth, police
were to be organized and managed as a highly-trained civil service devoted
to crime control, and were designed to be “insular, homogeneous, and
largely autonomous,” with guarantees of independence from politics, and
“purposely distanced” from the communities they were assigned to
protect. 17 The importance of gaining and holding the community’s trust
was widely acknowledged, and police leaders typically assumed that trust
would flow from legitimacy. But legitimacy came to be identified with
professional norms, a military style of leadership, and a detached, reactive
mode in which officers responded when called for help but deliberately kept
their distance from individuals in the local community. 18
The professional model bolstered one sort of democratic legitimacy—
political independence—but undermined another—the authority grounded
in the needs and preferences of the polity itself. Just at a time when broad

11
See Eric Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 549–52 (1992).
In Britain, where modern policing originated in 1829 at the behest of Sir Robert Peel, the
emphasis was different, and the police function was not embedded in municipal politics. See
generally WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND
LONDON (1999).
12
See generally JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); M. Craig Brown & Barbara
D. Warner, Immigrants, Urban Politics, and Policing in 1900, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 293 (1992).
13
WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS 271 (1977) (describing
this phenomenon but by no means endorsing it).
14
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY (1966).
15
See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 93 (2008) (discussing
“[t]he [p]reoccupation with [l]egitimacy”).
16
See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
17
SKLANSKY, supra note 15, at 6.
18
Id. at 93–94.
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grassroots authenticity was becoming the hallmark of democracy, 19 police
were reaching for an elite mantle of detached expertise. 20 Once again, their
legitimacy suffered.
Two adjustments were brought to bear. One was substantive: the due
process model through which the Warren and Burger Courts reaffirmed
constraints on law enforcement power and insisted that they be enforced not
only by the police bureaucracy but also by an independent judiciary. 21
The other adjustment was strategic. Emphasizing concepts like
“community policing” or “problem-oriented policing,” law enforcement
priorities were recalibrated. 22 Police effort henceforth would be guided (or
would claim to be guided) by the expressed preferences of “the
community,” as revealed in listening sessions at the grassroots and meetings
with acknowledged or self-proclaimed community leaders.23
A related model with a significantly different emphasis, “ordermaintenance policing” made it a priority for police to address local
problems, even those that did not rise to the level of grave crimes. 24 Its
widely accepted watchword was that “‘[b]roken windows’ do need to be
repaired quickly.” 25 Unlike many versions of community-oriented policing,
however, some versions of the order-maintenance approach assigned to the
police themselves the responsibility for identifying disorder. Another
conception of reform went a step further, from maintaining order to
eliminating all forms of disorder. Its message was zero tolerance: even
19

See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1756–62
(2005) [hereinafter Sklansky, Police and Democracy] (describing the movement in favor of
participatory democracy in the 1960s and 1970s).
20
See Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-solving and Community Policing, in MODERN
POLICING 99, 117 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (noting that police “became
cut off from the aspirations, desires, and concerns of citizens”).
21
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379–411
(2000) (summarizing case law); cf. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note 19, at 1749
(noting criticism of Warren Court precedents).
22
See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE (1986)
(describing police innovation in six American cities); id. at 10–11 (noting “the beginnings of
a social reconstruction of American policing” and “a strong inclination to recognize the
significance of community trust and cooperation”); id. at 211 (characterizing the new
approach as “community-oriented policing”).
23
See generally Moore, supra note 20; Jerome Skolnick & David Bayley, Theme and
Variation in Community Policing, 10 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1988). Despite its many purely
cosmetic features, the community policing movement also wrought many real and important
changes. See David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism (July
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
24
GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 160 (1996).
25
WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990).
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minor misconduct was to be systematically suppressed. Legitimacy would
come not from participatory democracy but from effectiveness; police
authority would be accepted and respected because it would achieve results.
Thus, for more than half a century, achieving and maintaining
“legitimacy” has been a central preoccupation both for those who support
law enforcement and for those who want to constrain it. But legitimacy has
been understood in sharply different terms: alternatively constitutional
(compliance with the rule of law), political (governance in conformity with
community preferences), or instrumental (success in reducing crime). The
politically-charged disagreements have produced profound transformations,
but one thing largely missing from the debates has been any effort to define
precisely what “legitimacy” means or how to measure it empirically.
Instead, an apparent consensus about the importance of police legitimacy
has masked radically different assumptions about what that is and how it
can be achieved.
Conceptual ambiguity and a failure to study empirical data bearing on
issues of broad policing strategy are mirrored in conclusory debates about
appropriate tactics for individual officers on the street. The debates,
roughly speaking, center on competing preferences for being tough or being
fair.
B. TACTICAL CHOICES: TOUGHNESS VERSUS FAIRNESS

Tough cops are not automatically unfair, and civil libertarians are not
automatically soft, but being tough and being fair are often assumed to be in
tension. A perception that police must to choose between them arises
almost everywhere in policing and in criminal law generally: street stops,
surveillance, Miranda rights, and so on. In each instance, some people feel
sure that social protection requires police powers that are unconstrained by
procedural niceties, and others are equally convinced that harsh measures, if
insensitive to individual rights, will prove counterproductive.
A similar argument arises in areas far outside of criminal justice.
During the Vietnam War, the issue was framed as a debate about whether
we should burn down villages sympathetic to the Viet Cong or focus
instead on winning hearts and minds. 26 The same dilemma is now one of
our military’s biggest preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan.27 A
commentator who admires former President George W. Bush recently
26

The debate is vividly presented in the 1974 documentary film Hearts and Minds,
directed by Peter Davis. HEARTS AND MINDS (BBS Productions & Rainbow Releasing
1974); see also Elizabeth Dickinson, A Bright Shining Slogan, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept./Oct.
2009, at 29.
27
See, e.g., Lara M. Dadkhah, Empty Skies over Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010,
at A27.
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stated that we must “project global power and military might [or else our]
hegemony will be challenged.” 28 A recent op-ed in the New York Times
derided our focus on hearts and minds in Afghanistan, arguing that it was
more important to kill members of the Taliban than to worry about civilian
casualties. 29 General Charles Krulak, a former commandant of the Marine
Corps, takes exactly the opposite view. He claims that the United States
military must use power sparingly because “the fundamental precept of
counterinsurgency” is to “[u]ndermine the enemy’s legitimacy while
building our own.” 30
Many Americans have little doubt that in each of these areas the tough
approach, whatever its moral drawbacks, at least will make them safer.31
Another group feels equally sure that being tough can be counterproductive.
The impact of toughness on effectiveness may be the most fundamental
question in the whole field of social conflict and social control. Though the
question is undeniably empirical, it is rarely treated as such; across the
political spectrum, nearly everyone assumes that it can be answered on the
basis of confident intuitions about the essence of human nature.
For police officers, toughness has not always been preferred. In the
early days of modern urban policing, British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel
stressed that “[t]he police must secure the willing cooperation of the public”
and that “[p]olice should use physical force . . . only when the exercise of
persuasion, advice, and warning is found to be insufficient.” 32 Yet in more
recent times, a preference for toughness has long held sway. Indeed,
toughness has often been defended as beneficial for everyone. Police
scholar William Muir described the mindset of police who believed that
“[t]he nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one has to be.”33 Skolnick and
Fyfe observe the prevalence of the same way of thought, adding that
“[c]ops and everyone else understand the reality of this paradox. And

28
Nile Gardiner, Bush Demonstrates That Hard Power Matters, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec.
27, 2008, at 33.
29
Dadkhah, supra note 27, at A27.
30
Charles C. Krulack & Joseph P. Hoar, Fear Was No Excuse To Condone Torture,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11, 2009, at 25A.
31
See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (plurality opinion) (discussing Chicago crackdown on “gangloitering”); Dadkhah, supra note 27, at A27 (arguing for aggressive use of airpower in
Afghanistan); John F. Harris, Mike Allen & Jim VandeHei, Cheney Warns of New Attacks,
POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2009, 6:12 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18390.html.
32
JOHN S. DEMPSEY & LINDA S. FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 8 (5th ed. 2010).
33
MUIR, supra note 13, at 41, 44, 101.
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whether or not they actually articulate it, cops develop styles of policing in
response to it.” 34
The instinctive preference of the cop on the beat using the tough
approach to policing style was potentially in tension with the notion that
police agencies should be “problem-oriented” or “community based.” 35 But
that tension dissolved in certain versions of the “order-maintenance”
approach, which emphasized aggressive street stops, along with “proactive
enforcement of misdemeanor laws and zero tolerance for minor offenses.” 36
In their seminal “Broken Windows” essay, Wilson and Kelling described
the perspective of departments that made it a priority to prevent low-level
disorder on the streets: “In the words of one officer, ‘We kick ass.’”37 A
Chicago police officer who was “not prepared to stand by and watch gangs
terrorize his family, friends, and neighbors” described “how he dealt with
gang members who would not follow his orders: ‘I say please once, I say
please twice, and then I knock them on their ass.’” 38
Even where police advocates of “community policing” were not
committed to zero-tolerance or aggressive tactics, meetings with
neighborhood groups evolved from the orientation required in communitybased models—a reciprocal problem-solving conversation—into “a bland,
one-sided, impersonal opportunity for city bureaucrats to manufacture
consent” for measures they had already decided to implement. 39
Although early assessments suggested that various order-maintenance
approaches were “working” (i.e., reducing crime), more careful analysis
revealed that aggressive street-level enforcement focused on quality-of-life
offenses did not make cities safer.40 Where genuine crime-control
34
JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
USE OF FORCE 95 (1993). Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note, however, that the tough style
is not always successful. Id.
35
See SKLANSKY, supra note 15, at 4, 123.
36
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001).
37
James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1982, at 29.
38
KELLING & COLES, supra note 24, at 166.
39
See William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety, 25 POLICING INT’L J.
POLICE STRAT. & MGMT 530, 534 (2002) (describing Seattle experience); cf. WESLEY G.
SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 113–14 (1997)
(describing the interactive nature of Chicago’s community policing program “beat
meetings”).
40
See HARCOURT, supra note 36, at 6–11, 59–121; see also Hubert Williams & Antony
M. Pate, Returning to First Principles: Reducing the Fear of Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME &
DELINQ. 53, 67 (1986) (noting that order-maintenance policies in Newark failed to achieve
their goals); Frank Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York and the Future of Crime
Control, SCI. AM. (forthcoming August 2011) (manuscript on file with authors).
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successes have been achieved, they seem attributable, at best, only to
discrete, narrowly targeted programs that are unrelated (or antithetical) to
order-maintenance enforcement of low-level crimes. 41 Similarly, research
does not support the widely held belief that police are always wise to seek
to dominate situations by force; when police react to perceived threats by
displaying force, their actions often escalate the conflict. 42
How could it be that energetic policing, with a high volume of street
stops, searches, and arrests, was not helping to reduce crime or protect
officer safety? One place to look for a possible answer is the tradition that
sees the legitimacy of official authority not through the lens of
constitutional law, politics, or economic efficiency, but rather from the
perspective of empirical social psychology.
C. LEGITIMACY AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTE

The psychological model of legitimacy posits that people obey the law,
irrespective of expected rewards and penalties, when they view the
government as worthy of trust and respect. This model’s theoretical
foundation is found in the work of Max Weber, who argued that legitimacy
in this psychological sense was the key to the effectiveness of the state. 43
People must believe “that some decision . . . is entitled to be obeyed by
virtue of who made the decision or how it was made.” 44
In the context of criminal justice, a large body of research confirms the
links between perceived legitimacy and willingness to obey the law. To be
sure, potential criminals are sometimes influenced by straightforward
material incentives. People who steal cars or rob banks often take into
account the chances of getting caught. There is much evidence that
criminals can be influenced to commit their crimes at different times or

41
See Zimring, supra note 40, at 30 (arguing that crime-control successes in New York
City cannot be attributed to aggressive quality-of-life law enforcement, that in fact the
NYPD, its rhetoric notwithstanding, de-emphasized this tactic, and that at most only one
aspect of New York’s aggressive street-stops approach (the targeting of certain “hot-spots”)
may be responsible for New York’s crime-control gains).
42
JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND
PROCEDURALLY JUST TACTICS 171 (2003).
43
MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 336 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (noting that "every domination . . . always has the
strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of legitimation"); id. at
341 (describing legitimacy as prestige resting on beliefs of members of a political
community).
44
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 377 (2006).
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places. And sometimes potential sanctions induce them to commit the
offenses less frequently or not at all.45
But research also finds strong support for the psychological legitimacy
model. In many situations, people obey the law not because of fear of
getting caught but simply because they view the legal authorities as
legitimate and believe that legitimate authorities should be obeyed. 46
Perceived legitimacy is assessed by asking people to express their degree of
faith in various public institutions, as measured by their belief that officials
are trustworthy, concerned about the welfare of those with whom they deal,
able to protect citizens against crime, and otherwise do their jobs well. 47
People who express a high degree of confidence in public authorities
comply with the law either because of social influence (they want to avoid
the disapproval of their social group) or because of internalized moral
norms (they want to see themselves as decent people who do the right
thing). 48 Legitimacy thus enables authorities to maintain social order
almost automatically, without incurring the heavy costs required by
instrumental strategies relying on arrest, adjudication, and incarceration. 49
How can the police build this valuable attribute of legitimacy?
Empirical research indicates that this sort of legitimacy is sustained not by
an aggressive style that subordinates individual rights but rather by
something closer to its opposite—practices that can be grouped under the
heading of procedural justice.
III. THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL
The procedural justice concept captures the fairness of the process
used to make and apply rules and the quality of the personal treatment
45
Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12–15 (1998) (summarizing studies on the effect of sanctions
on criminal deterrence).
46
See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 59 (rev. ed. 2006) [hereinafter TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY]; cf. Clemens Kroneberg, Isolde Heintze & Guido Mehlkop, The
Interplay of Moral Norms and Instrumental Incentives in Crime Causation, 48
CRIMINOLOGY 259, 283 (2010) (suggesting that although normative mechanisms are more
important, some people only respond to incentives).
47
See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 270–71 (2008).
48
See Kroneberg, Heintze & Mehlkop, supra note 46, at 259 (using survey data to
determine the influence of different factors upon compliance); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468 (1997) (summarizing research that
indicates an alternative explanation for obedience of the law because “fear of arrest and
incarceration in prison is not effective in causing people to obey the law”).
49
See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 309 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Legitimacy] (reviewing literature to
this effect).
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people receive from authorities.50 Perceived fairness in decisionmaking has
been found to be determined by such matters as whether police are viewed
as unbiased and consistent and whether they give people opportunities to be
heard before they take action. Perceived fairness of treatment, the research
shows, is determined by such matters as whether police are courteous and
respectful of people and their rights.
Conventional wisdom posits that the primary issue for people dealing
with legal authorities is the outcome of the interaction. It is assumed, for
example, that when a driver receives a traffic ticket, he is likely to be upset,
but that if the encounter ends without issuance of a ticket, the driver is more
likely to be happy. But empirical research tells a different story. An
extensive body of data demonstrates that while people are happier when
they do not receive an unfavorable result such as a traffic ticket, the
principal factor shaping their reactions is whether law enforcement officials
exercise authority in ways that are perceived to be fair.51 This is true for
both those who do and those who do not receive the unfavorable result.
These findings have been replicated using a wide array of methodologies
such as field research, panel studies, and experimental studies in “dozens of
social, legal, and organizational contexts.” 52
The implications of this research for policing tactics are obvious but
seldom appreciated. When police ramp up their arrest rates for low-level
offenses like vandalism and vagrancy, the broken windows hypothesis
suggests that neighborhood residents should be pleased by these efforts to
combat disorder. 53 But opinion surveys often confound that expectation,
50

See TOM R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 36–43
(2007); Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25
Years of Organizational Justice, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 426 (2001).
51
See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND THE LAW (2002); Kimberly Belvedere, John L. Worrall & Stephen G.
Tibbetts, Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. REV.
30 (2005); Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson & Elizabeth A. Stanko, Contact and Confidence:
Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, 19 POLICING AND SOC’Y 20
(2009); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q.
255 (2010); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy and Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE &
CRIM. PSYCHOL. 10 (2009); Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jeffrey B. Snipes & Anne E. Supina,
Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 269 (1996); Michael D. Reisig & Meghan Stroshine Chandek, The Effects
of Expectancy Disconfirmation on Outcome Satisfaction in Police-Citizen Encounters, 24
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 88 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 431 (2003).
52
Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of
Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2005).
53
See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 301–10 (1996)
(emphasizing “the sector of the black law-abiding population that desires more rather than
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finding that where arrest rates for these offenses rise or where other
“crackdown” tactics are implemented, approval of the police has declined.54
In light of the research we have canvassed, these results are not mysterious:
tough measures, if implemented without fairness, are likely to arouse
resentment rather than appreciation.
By contrast, toughness with fairness can be productive. In a study that
interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and following a personal experience
with the police, people who received a traffic citation from an officer who
treated them fairly tended to view the police as more legitimate and were
significantly more willing to cooperate with the police than they had been
before that encounter. 55 As a result, the police can take actions to control
crime and build legitimacy at the same time.
The assumption that there is a zero-sum trade-off between individual
rights and public safety is therefore far too simple. When perceptions of
procedural justice and legitimacy decline, people’s willingness to obey also
declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy, people are more
willing to comply with the law. 56 And importantly, procedural fairness
matters in similar ways for white, African-American, and Hispanic
respondents, with only minor variations reflecting differences in the issues
that are most salient to different ethnic groups.57
Few would argue that compliance can never be achieved in the
absence of procedural justice. Obedience can still be obtained, but only
through intensive enforcement and harsh punishment. And that route—the
one America has largely followed since the 1960s—is not only expensive
from the start, but it can also trigger a downward spiral. Harsh repression
enhances material incentives for compliance, but it weakens perceptions of
less prosecution and punishment for all types of criminals”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L.
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1169–70 (1998)
(same).
54
WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 15, 118 (1990); Brooks, supra note 2, at
1225.
55
Tyler & Fagan, supra note 45, at 261.
56
See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555 (2003). Some suggest
that this line of argument glosses over a causal ambiguity: Citizens’ perceptions of
procedural fairness may be “colored by [their] views about the legitimacy of the police or
courts.” David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 32–33 (T. Tyler et al. eds. 2007). If so,
perceived legitimacy may shape perceptions of procedural fairness, rather than the other way
around. The legitimacy research has used a variety of strategies to exclude this possibility.
See, e.g., Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47, at 251 (using panel data to measure judgments of
legitimacy and procedural justice before and after encounters with the police).
57
See Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust
and Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 336 (2005).
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fairness and thus the willingness to comply voluntarily. And that effect
requires yet another increase in the use of aggressive enforcement
measures, a step which in turn weakens voluntary compliance even more.
Most of the research testing the legitimacy model has focused on
willingness to violate the law. But recent research also examines the links
between procedural justice, legitimacy, and police capacity to secure
cooperation from the general public. 58
When police are combating crime and disorder, they need the help of
the community. 59 People who discover a criminal in hiding have to decide
whether to report him. When a crime is occurring, they have to make a
similar decision. They may also be asked to attend community meetings to
discuss policing strategies or to participate in activities such as
neighborhood watch. In all these cases, police success in fighting crime
depends upon public cooperation. And cooperation is a more fragile
commodity than compliance, because it is easy for people not to cooperate.
Even when material incentives have only limited impact on behavior, they
are far more likely to influence compliance than cooperation: When does a
mere bystander face penalties for not reporting a crime or for not attending
a community meeting? People must want to cooperate with the police.
Yet in many low-income African-American and Hispanic
neighborhoods, anti-snitching campaigns and other signs of mistrust make
clear that, even where citizens are law-abiding and desperate to have safe
neighborhoods, their cooperation with the police cannot be taken for
granted. 60
The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the
police—for example, by reporting suspicious behavior or by participating in
crime prevention programs—is strongly linked to a person’s belief that
police authority is legitimate. And that belief is strong only when officials
exercise their authority fairly. Conversely, when perceptions of procedural
justice and legitimacy decline, willingness to cooperate also declines.61 In
one study, procedural fairness was more than twice as important for
58
See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 39; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47; Tom R. Tyler, Stephen
J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010).
59
See Robert J. Sampson, S. W. Raudenbush & F. Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent
Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
60
See Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and
Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193 (2008).
61
See Lyons, supra note 39, at 536, 538 (profiling and other tactics resented in minority
communities “make it more difficult for citizens in those communities with the information
we seek to communicate [it] effectively . . . . Effective partnerships . . . only produce the
desired forms of cooperation when they operate as a mechanism to increase understanding,
trust and respect among the parties . . . .”).
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securing cooperation as judgments about police competence or the fairness
of outcomes. 62
In short, an emphasis on fairness appears to be central to police
success in maintaining social order. Even though tough enforcement
measures seem to increase an offender’s probability of apprehension and
conviction, the net effect of tough measures can be the opposite, and not
only because toughness tends to chill voluntary compliance. Toughness
also chills cooperation from the law-abiding community. That reduced
cooperation in turn decreases the probabilities of apprehension and
conviction, and those effects in turn decrease even the involuntary
compliance achieved through the threat of sanctions.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE MODEL
In this Part, we discuss the implications of the procedural justice
research for concrete policy measures in two areas of conventional
policing—control of ordinary crime and control of misconduct by the police
themselves. We then turn to its implications for domestic counterterrorism
policing.
A. CONTROLLING ORDINARY CRIME

Many zero-tolerance and order-maintenance models of policing, along
with other instrumental approaches, emphasize efforts to control crime by
increasing the density of police on the street and the frequency of street
stops. For example, over a three-year period, a Chicago initiative aimed at
containing misbehavior by unruly youth and gang members led police to
order over 89,000 individuals to disperse and resulted in the arrest of over
42,000 people on charges of “gang loitering.” 63 From 2003 to 2007, the
number of street stops in New York City rose 500%, even though the crime
rate was stable. 64 And these stops were disproportionally concentrated
among minority group members. 65 Data from other jurisdictions show
similar patterns.66

62

See Tyler, Legitimacy, supra note 49, at 379–80 (comparing influence of perceived
legitimacy and police effectiveness on willingness to cooperate).
63
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49–50 (1999) (plurality opinion).
64
Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken
Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and
Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D.
White eds., 2010).
65
See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City
Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 813–14 (2007) (finding that African-American and Hispanic
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The procedural justice research described above suggests, however,
that these efforts are likely to produce mixed or even counterproductive
results. If carefully targeted crackdown measures do indeed have some
crime-control payoff, as may have been the case recently in New York
City, 67 and if such measures are therefore to be replicated and extended, it
becomes particularly important to ensure that they are implemented wisely;
the police departments that resort to them must exercise special care not to
arouse resentment that offsets most of the expected benefits. Even worse,
to the extent that stop-and-search practices and frequent arrests for lowlevel public-order offenses are seen as severe or racially selective, as they
apparently are in many urban communities, 68 these practices may actually
impede compliance and voluntary cooperation with law enforcement.
“[I]ntensive frisks and needless arrests can often be a source of friction,”
thereby “undermining the very sense of legal legitimacy they were designed
to foster.” 69
The damage can be especially great when street sweeps and arrests for
“loitering” bear down on youth who are perceived as threats to a wellordered community. The views of children and adolescents about law and
the courts are shaped by many factors, including parents, teachers, gangs,
the media, and interactions with the police.70 Because adult orientations
toward the law are often formed during adolescence, these precursors of
adult attitudes are crucial. A considerable literature inspired by the broken
windows hypothesis has posited that norms of law-abiding behavior can be
nurtured by a strong law enforcement presence that exerts control over
public spaces, stigmatizes gang membership, and drives disorderly youth

pedestrians in New York City were stopped more frequently than whites, even after
controlling for race-specific estimates of criminal offending).
66
In Los Angeles, for example, in 2003–2004 there were 4,569 stops per 10,000 AfricanAmerican residents, but only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white residents. See IAN AYRES &
JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–7 (2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.
67
See Zimring, supra note 40.
68
See supra text at notes 65–66.
69
Reed Collins, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New
Crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419, 426 (2007); see also Delgado,
supra note 60, at 1202; K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden
Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271,
313 (2009).
70
Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715, 718–19
(2007).
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off the streets. 71 Yet the empirical research canvassed here suggests the
opposite—that intensive law enforcement and a readiness to arrest for lowlevel offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken police
legitimacy, and undermine voluntary compliance with the law. 72
Tactics that emphasize procedural justice can be equally effective with
fewer negative side effects. In the procedural justice model, officers are not
oriented toward addressing situations primarily with the threat of force.
Instead, officers are trained to view every citizen contact as an opportunity
to build legitimacy through the tone and quality of the interaction, with
force a last resort.
Although police leaders have long paid lip service to the importance of
gaining community trust, concrete steps to further this goal were either
nonexistent or (as in the community policing movement) centered on
discussion forums largely divorced from the daily activity of the cop on the
beat. More recently, police departments across the country have begun to
make more tangible efforts, but only in discrete programs of limited scope.
An innovative Boston initiative engaged inner-city ministers and other
community leaders in an effort to convince at-risk youth to steer clear of
firearms. 73 In High Point, North Carolina, police managed to shut down
open-air drug markets by offering dealers a dignified opportunity to avoid
arrest in return for a commitment to abandon the drug trade. 74 A Chicago
program has reportedly succeeded in reducing violence and recidivism by
organizing discussion forums in which gun offenders on probation or parole
meet with police officers, neighborhood residents, and social workers for
discussions in which their concerns are treated with respect and their needs
are addressed with support instead of only threats of punishment. 75

71

See, e.g., MARTIN S. JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN
URBAN SOCIETY 193–202 (1991); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of
Life in Public Spaces, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 640–42 (1997).
72
See supra text at notes 54, 56; Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of
Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 217 (2005); see also Tracey Meares, The
Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009).
To be sure, further research is needed to clarify the links between adolescent experience and
adult attitudes toward authority.
73
See Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring & Anne Morrison Piehl,
Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s
Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 198, 220 (2000).
74
See Mark Schoofs, New Intervention: Novel Police Tactic Puts Drug Markets out of
Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A1.
75
See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons:
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 254
(2007).
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Reportedly, as many as seventy-five cities are now implementing
legitimacy-inspired initiatives of this kind.76
Although the value of such programs is now widely recognized, police
departments have yet to fully appreciate their psychological basis and their
relevance to the full range of policing activity. Perhaps more worrisome is
the fact that in many departments, officers have learned to acknowledge
verbally the need to build community trust even when their behavior on the
beat brazenly contradicts that commitment. In a 2004 study, Gould and
Mastrofski observed officers subjecting black suspects stopped on the street
without justification to humiliating strip searches and rectal examination in
public settings; back at the stationhouse, the same officers “expressed a
desire to establish strong bonds with neighborhood residents and to treat all
citizens, including suspects, with a respectful demeanor.”77 Clearly, much
more must be done to communicate convincingly to police officers the
substance of that objective. And equally important, officers must fully
appreciate its rationale and empirical foundations, if they are to internalize
the message.
Forcible street contacts will inevitably cause anxiety and discomfort
for pedestrians and motorists who are stopped, and police departments must
therefore remain sensitive to the need to control their frequency, especially
when declining rates of success in the resulting searches and declining
arrest rates (as a percentage of all stops) signal diminishing returns. But
forcible stops obviously should not be withdrawn from the law enforcement
arsenal. Stops based on objective indications of a serious offense are
almost always warranted, and they need not trigger community mistrust if
police pay attention to what happens during such stops. Indeed, the
available data suggest that although African Americans resent high levels of
arrest for public-order offenses, their approval of the police is “positively
correlated with arrest rates for more serious offenses.” 78
Thus, if stops are carefully initiated, police would not have to reduce
their frequency. But even then, the procedural justice approach emphasizes
a need for change: police departments must focus on altering the dynamics
of police–citizen interaction. Instead of seeking to instill fear or project
power, officers would aim to treat citizens courteously, briefly explain the
reason for a stop, and, absent exigent circumstances, give the citizen an
opportunity to explain herself before significant decisions are made.
76
See Meares, supra note 72, at 665 & n.95; see also MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN
BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009) (discussing
strategies to reduce crime with less reliance on arrest and incarceration).
77
Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 345 (2004).
78
Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225–26.
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Moreover, they must be trained to maintain this orientation from the
beginning of an encounter. An officer who initiates a stop in an aggressive
manner, assuming the worst, cannot easily pivot to a polite, diffident stance
if his suspicions prove unfounded. And even if he can do so, his
explanations and apologies are unlikely to go far with an innocent citizen
subjected to peremptory language and rough treatment at the outset.
These elements of procedurally-fair interaction go well beyond
constitutional minimums, which typically focus on limiting what the
government can do. But many requirements of constitutional law and
criminal procedure do limit the way that government power is exercised.
Even when officers have probable cause and a search warrant, the Fourth
Amendment normally requires them to knock, announce their presence,
state the basis of their authority, and give the homeowner an opportunity to
admit them peaceably. 79 Officers normally must give the homeowner a
copy of the warrant, to provide official confirmation of their authority and
the limits on the permitted scope of the search.80 After the search, they
must deliver an inventory of items seized to establish a record of their
actions and a readily understood basis for challenging unauthorized
conduct. 81 These requirements, so often celebrated in Fourth Amendment
tradition, 82 are not about limiting the tangible burdens government may
impose; indeed the traditional abhorrence of clandestine searches 83 is hard
to understand from a purely material perspective. The point of these
requirements is essentially the same as that which the procedural justice
findings stress—the importance of government’s perceived legitimacy,

79
See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003) (discussing requirement of
“reasonable wait time”); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (finding failure to
knock and announce permissible only when officers have reasonable suspicion that doing so
would be dangerous or futile); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (holding that
common law “knock and announce” requirement forms part of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness inquiry).
80
The obligation to provide a copy of the warrant is typically grounded in statutes or
court rules but generally has not been treated as a Fourth Amendment requirement. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4, at
177–78 (3d ed. 2000).
81
City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (basing this requirement on
Fourteenth Amendment due process rather than the Fourth Amendment).
82
See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931–33 (tracing lineage of the knock-and-announce rule
back to the thirteenth century and finding that it “was woven quickly into the fabric of early
American law”).
83
See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
clandestine search permissible only when secrecy is “essential”); United States v. Freitas,
800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when circumstances justify clandestine
search, notice to homeowner must nonetheless be given within seven days; extensions of this
period permissible only on a “strong showing of necessity”).
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sustained by actions that build trust and treat citizens with respect. The
Miranda warnings were designed to serve the identical purpose,
communicating to the suspect that officers will treat him with dignity and
acknowledge his rights. 84
There is no reason, however, for police conceptions of fair treatment to
stop with the constitutional minimum. In connection with street stops,
operational guidelines within each department could formalize appropriate
steps, such as the need for courteous treatment, the obligation to give the
citizen a reason for the stop, and a chance to explain the circumstances. In
this spirit, the review committee established to examine the Gates incident
in Cambridge cautioned that “actions that police take to protect their safety
and the safety of others can seem cold, insensitive, or overly
authoritarian . . . . Whatever police can reasonably do to explain the
reasons for the interaction and deescalate a situation is vital to the peaceful
resolution of the encounter.” 85 Such steps could be made a routine part of
every officer’s behavior on the beat. With their low cost and potential for
high crime-control payoff, changes like these are a smart use of limited
police resources.
As a simple way to put such priorities into practice, officers could
easily carry and give to those they stop a card containing a short statement
of the rules that govern police stops. The card would enumerate the rights
that must be respected (including the right to have the reasons for the stop
explained and the right to tell their side of the story before decisions are
made) and the procedures for complaining about unfair treatment. Such
efforts help communicate to the public that procedural justice principles are
taken seriously.
Because trust in the police varies dramatically across racial lines, 86
policing methods must be especially attuned to racial sensibilities. Of
course, that point in itself is not new. But we can illustrate the need for a
new emphasis by considering the issue of “profiling” and the Gates incident
in particular. Traditionally the study of racial profiling has focused upon
whether reliance on racial markers actually occurs. We might ask, for
example, if Officer Crowley took into account Professor Gates’s AfricanAmerican appearance or whether the police generally profile minorities. To
do so we would collect statistics on street stops, adjust them for actual rates
84

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–60 (1966) (stating that in the absence of
warnings, custodial interrogation “trades on the weaknesses of individuals” and is
“destructive of human dignity”; “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
[against self-incrimination] is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).
85
See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 27.
86
See supra text at note 2.
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of offending in the target population, and analyze the data to determine if
the police stop African Americans more often than is justified by
objectively based concerns about crime.
Following the argument of this Article, however, the Gates case (and
other minority experiences with the police) would be approached from a
different perspective. People generally view racial profiling as unfair, and
when police action leads people to feel they have been profiled, it prompts
hostility. 87 This response was evident when Professor Gates reacted to his
perception that his treatment was explained simply by the fact that he was a
“Black man in America.” 88 The belief that the police are using unfair
procedures delegitimates their authority and leads people to resist it.
This finding has two important implications. First, a person can be
strongly affected by police contact even if nothing legally significant
happens. Even when people are not arrested, they can still feel
disrespected, and this will change their views about the police. As a
consequence, experiences need to be evaluated in terms of their influence
upon the person’s views about the police, not just in terms of whether
people were arrested and searched, or why (from the officer’s perspective)
he decided to act. Even trivial incivilities contribute to a climate of
illegitimacy. The Supreme Court, along with countless other observers, has
repeatedly missed this point. 89
Second, people can have a positive experience even when the police
take some potentially unwelcome enforcement action. Police can therefore
act to control crime and build legitimacy at the same time. As shown in the
research we have canvassed above, people who received a negative decision
(such as a traffic ticket) from an officer who treated them fairly viewed the
police as more legitimate than they did before the encounter.90 In short,
police who treat people even-handedly and with respect can reinforce their
legitimacy even when they are compelled by the situation to act firmly and
aggressively—force is more acceptable when it is viewed as reasonable and
87

Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and the Legitimacy of the Police:
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social Authority, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 13, 13–42 (2004).
88
See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 56.
89
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding authority of vicesquad officers to make arrest for failure to signal a turn, whether or not their action was
pretextual). Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 563 (1976)
(holding “objective intrusion” was “minimal” because of stops’ “public and relatively
routine nature,” even though stops were made “on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry”),
with id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that the “experience [would be] particularly
vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the
officers’ target is the Mexican alien”).
90
See supra text at note 50.
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justified and when it is delivered through just procedures. These
implications are relevant to much more than just race relations. The
research on legitimacy establishes that America’s policing model for
dealing with people in all communities and of all ethnicities needs to
change.
Of course, there is a danger here. Police who successfully cultivate a
courteous, self-effacing demeanor could use that façade to mask
discriminatory and unnecessarily intrusive practices. We should perhaps be
careful what we wish for. But police are as yet light years away from
acquiring the attitudes and behavior on patrol that could make this danger a
reality. The prospect of that unintended consequence simply underscores
that a new emphasis on the neglected qualitative dimension of police–
citizen interaction must complement but not displace the equally important
quantitative dimensions. The frequency of stops, the success rates of
associated searches, and the distribution of these outcomes across racial and
ethnic groups are already important tools for gauging police performance.
We claim that these metrics have too often monopolized attention, but an
appreciation for the significance of perceived legitimacy would not by any
means render these measures irrelevant or obsolete.
B. POLICE MISCONDUCT

Attention to legitimacy is important for another sort of compliance—
compliance by police officers themselves.
Nearly all existing models of policing posit that an officer seeking to
prevent crime and disorder wants to exert force (conducting stops, searches,
and arrests) and that this desire is held in check by an unwelcome,
externally imposed constraint—the obligation to remain within
constitutional boundaries. Professor Herbert Packer captured this notion
and etched it into several generations of criminal procedure scholarship
with his influential paradigm contrasting a “crime control model” (one that
emphasizes the goal of reducing crime as efficiently as possible) with a
“due process model” (one that gives priority to maintaining respect for
individual rights). 91
In this view, police who disregard search and seizure rules may face
penalties (suppression of evidence, civil damages, or administrative
sanctions), and such penalties are assumed to encourage compliance
through the instrumental logic of deterrence. The officer considers every
stop and every search as potentially beneficial, but she must weigh those
benefits against potential sanctions. When the officer can foresee that an
exclusionary rule applies, the expected costs will outweigh benefits,
91

HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
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misconduct will be deterred, and compliance with constitutional norms will
be achieved. Conversely, if an officer cannot foresee the prospect of an
exclusionary sanction, her behavior supposedly cannot be affected. For the
current Supreme Court, this logic has become an analytic obsession, as a
majority of the Justices now approach nearly every issue concerning the
exclusionary rule by examining the details of presumed deterrence effects
under particular circumstances. 92
From a legitimacy perspective, inquiries of this sort (whatever their
conclusions) are profoundly misguided. The empirical research makes clear
that fear of sanctions by itself generates only weak, poorly motivating
incentives, which in turn produce at best a sullen, resentful, imperfect form
of compliance. And this is exactly what we often observe in the case of
police officers asked to comply with the rules of search and seizure.
Indeed, the payoff from instrumental deterrence in that context is especially
poor, just as we would expect, because those rules and their accompanying
sanctions enjoy little legitimacy in the eyes of the police to whom they are
addressed. Like the exclusionary rule and for similar reasons, damage suits
and institutional reform litigation have had only mixed success in changing
the culture of police organizations.93
The legitimacy perspective makes clear that seeking to compel change
through suppression remedies, lawsuits, and consent decrees can have only
limited effectiveness because the police then seek ways to avoid detection
and accountability. Just as with achieving compliance by the public, so
with the police: we need to change what they want to do.
The difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment requirements is
telling here. Police compliance with the rules of search and seizure is
always in doubt; evasion and even outright perjury are sometimes the
officer’s preferred course. 94 In contrast, police interrogators for the most
part follow Miranda and give the warnings routinely. The reason is simple:

92
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (exclusionary rule
applies only when exclusion can “meaningfully deter” police misconduct); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–97 (2006) (same); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907
(1984) (same). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (exclusionary rule may not be
invoked to suppress fruits of an illegal search that did not violate the defendant’s personal
rights).
93
See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 464–78 (2004) (cataloguing reasons why individual remedies are
ineffective at changing police institutions); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the
Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 480–88 (1992) (discussing lack of
success in judicial efforts to change police culture).
94
See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (1992)
(documenting pervasive police perjury used to avoid exclusionary rule in important cases).
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police have learned that they benefit from compliance, because the Miranda
warnings tend to put suspects at ease by creating a (false) sense of security
and thereby help officers to get confessions. 95
The procedural justice model is promising from this perspective both
for the reasons outlined above and because the changes in police practices it
calls for 96 are simple to implement and relatively inexpensive. More
important, they benefit the police themselves, not just outside citizens and
“bad guys.” By projecting sensitivity to procedural justice, officers build
their legitimacy and nurture public support. They thereby gain community
respect, enhance the safety of their working environment, and create
conditions likely to elicit greater cooperation in fighting crime. The police
are gradually transformed from an occupying force into genuine partners
with all components of the community, minorities and the poor included.
And, of course, such changes also benefit the community, in particular
minorities and the poor, who are policed in a more professional and
respectful manner.
We do not doubt the importance of penalties such as the exclusionary
rule and will have more to say about them in a moment. But reform of
police organizations must start from within. Articles that make a seemingly
similar point—for example, urging reliance on internal police guidelines,
civilian review boards, and administrative sanctions—are too numerous to
count, but nearly all proposals of this sort lack an essential feature: positive
motivation. The empirical findings make clear that police must want to
follow such guidelines, because (as in the case of citizens who might
contemplate other sorts of wrongdoing) the probability that a violation will
be detected and punished often is too low to provide in itself a sufficiently
strong reason for obedience.
Creating positive motivations for compliance is essential not only to
ensure respect for citizens’ rights but also to achieve adherence to a broad
range of internal operational standards and norms. A working environment
conducive to those motivations involves several elements.
The
management literature develops them in detail, 97 and we do not propose to
discuss them in depth here. But the key ingredient is worth emphasizing,
though it is obvious from what we have already said, because the criminal
procedure and organizational-reform literature almost always assumes that
ingredient to be missing and unattainable. The ingredient, of course, is the
95
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516–38 (1996) (reviewing evidence
to this effect).
96
See supra text at notes 73–90.
97
See, e.g., V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Responsibility and Risk in
Organizational Crimes of Obedience, 14 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 49 (1992).
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legitimacy of the rules in question. And by legitimacy here, we do not
mean a legal or constitutional legitimacy grounded in a duly enacted text.
Rather, as we have stressed throughout, the key concept is social and
psychological legitimacy, from the perspective of the target audience whose
compliance is sought. Officers must come to understand that observing the
tenets of procedural justice will serve their own interest, apart from the
constitutional pedigree of these norms, even when (as with many of the fairtreatment dimensions of procedural justice) the norms are by no means
constitutionally mandated.
1. Tone from the Top
Attaining this sort of legitimacy begins with the “tone from the top.”
Police leaders must emphasize the value of building public support, helping
citizens to feel comfortable and safe rather than threatened by the police
presence. Leaders must communicate that while force will always have a
role in policing, that role should be as a last resort, one that should seldom
need to be used.
2. Recognition and Reward
Police reward structures also need to be reshaped so that building
legitimacy in the community is viewed as a goal of equal importance to
issuing traffic tickets and making arrests. If officers believe that their
advancement, compensation, and respect in the eyes of their leadership are
linked to their ability to create legitimacy and motivate cooperation, they
are more likely to follow the principles of procedural fairness in their
behavior on the street.
When considering incentive structures, it is important to think beyond
material rewards. Studies of work organizations suggest that the impact of
material rewards generally flows through their role in signaling
management respect for employees and their contributions. Employees
want to know that their efforts are valued by their superiors. 98 Studies of
police organizations indicate that one of the best ways to communicate
respect is to follow the principles of procedural justice (fair decisionmaking
and fair interpersonal treatment) in dealing with officers themselves.
Officers in the ranks should be afforded a voice in the formulation of the
rules that govern their performance (a step to which police departments
have recently become more receptive), and they must feel fairly treated in
connection with internal discipline and civilian review board procedures.
98

See Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143,
1153 (2005).
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Officers who feel respected are more likely to accept departmental policies
as legitimate and to comply with them voluntarily. 99
Correspondingly, officers need to believe that their adherence to these
policies will be recognized by their superiors. Being able to reward the
police in this way requires new sorts of data. Routine efforts to follow up
on police–citizen contact can verify compliance with procedural justice
principles and reinforce a procedural justice culture within the police
department. Police statisticians must move beyond their preoccupation
with clearance rates to measure trends in public confidence in the police and
in public evaluations of the fairness of police practices, both among those
who have had personal experiences with the police and in the community
generally. In London, for example, the Metropolitan Police now routinely
surveys the public to ascertain levels of public confidence in law
enforcement and willingness to cooperate. 100 Such data collection efforts
nurture the legitimacy of procedural justice norms in the eyes of the cop on
the beat while also signaling to the public that support for these norms is
genuine within the police department itself.
A similar linkage between public perceptions and police attitudes in
matters of procedural justice could profitably be examined in connection
with civilian review boards or purely internal disciplinary processes. We
need to pay more attention to the ways in which these review mechanisms
are seen in the eyes of both citizens and the cops who are potentially subject
to them. And in line with the theme of nurturing legitimacy by rewards as
well as sanctions, civilian review boards could well make it part of their
mission to look for successes as well as the most egregious failures, and to
ensure that successes are appropriately recognized.
3. The Exclusionary Rule
If the perceived legitimacy of the rules governing police behavior is
the key to compliance, and if instrumental incentives have little bite, can we
dispense with sanctions like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule? The
question is by no means merely academic. A chorus of voices has argued
that changes in urban politics and in the demography and professionalism of
the police have made obsolete the judicially enforced criminal procedure
restraints developed by the Warren and Burger Courts in response to police

99

Tom R. Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan & Jeffrey Frost, Armed, and Dangerous (?):
Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457,
481, 483 (2007).
100
For details on the methodology and results of the most recent survey, see
Metropolitan Police Service (London), Public Confidence in Policing London,
http://www.met.police.uk/about/performance/confidence.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
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And the Supreme Court itself seems
oppression of minorities. 101
increasingly ready to gut the exclusionary rule or abandon it completely. 102
There is much to be said on the other side of this debate, 103 but here we
focus solely on the research findings concerning procedural justice and
legitimacy.
From its inception, the exclusionary rule has reflected two distinct,
though complementary concerns. One is the desire “to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 104 But in adopting the
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court also stressed that “there is
another consideration—the imperative of judicial integrity.” 105
For both Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, “judicial integrity” was
the decisive point. As Justice Brandeis put it, exclusion of tainted evidence
is essential “to maintain respect for law . . . [and] to preserve the judicial
process from contamination.” 106 The objective, he said in one of his best

101

See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (stating that “[a]nother
development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations [thus making the
exclusionary rule less necessary] is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including
a new emphasis on internal police discipline”); Kahan & Meares, supra note 53, at 1169–70
(stating that in “today’s inner city . . . the citizens who support giving more discretion to the
police are the same ones who are exposed to the risk that discretion will be abused”).
102
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (rejecting the rule that
suppression is presumptively mandated for all illegally seized evidence and holding that
“police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”);
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 597, 599 (stating that the exclusionary rule should be applied only
where deterrence benefits outweigh its “massive” social costs, and, because “much has
changed” since 1961, exclusion is not necessarily justified today simply because that remedy
was held necessary “in different contexts and long ago”).
103
The Fourth Amendment at its inception had nothing whatever to do with preventing
racial oppression, and to the extent that this concern has greater salience today, it is not
plausible to suggest that American policing tactics have rendered it obsolete. In any event,
there is no evidence to support (and much evidence to contradict) the Court’s assumption in
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98, that civil damage liability provides all the deterrence needed.
See id., at 609–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that any damages awarded are likely to be
nominal); Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[P]rofessionalism is a
sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy—not of its superfluity”); David Alan Sklansky, Is the
Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 579–82 (2008) (“Despite the
genuinely vast changes in law enforcement over the past forty years, the exclusionary rule
probably still does a lot of work that no other remedy stands ready to duplicate.”).
104
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105
Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]t [is] a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.”).
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known opinions, is not to tip the balance of an individual officer’s
incentives but to protect the foundations of government itself: “Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example . . . . If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anarchy.” 107 Justice
Brennan urged the same view, emphasizing that suppression of tainted
evidence “assur[es] the people . . . that the government would not profit
from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously
undermining popular trust in government.” 108
In its latest opinions, the Court acknowledged that this perspective
dominated at the outset, but declared that “we have long since rejected that
approach.” 109 Instead, the Court now insists that exclusion is justified
solely by potential deterrence of police misconduct, and it gives that
rationale a newly constrained form. Two conditions must be met: there
must be “appreciable” deterrence and, in addition, “[t]o the extent that
application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental
deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial
social costs.” 110 As a result, exclusion now is “our last resort, not our first
impulse.” 111 And raising even further this barrier to a suppression remedy,
the Court seems to have set aside the long-standing rule of exclusion for the
fruits of objectively unreasonable police searches and arrests. Instead, “[t]o
trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” 112 This new
approach gives the police, and is expressly designed to give the police,
much greater freedom to secure convictions by using illegally seized
evidence.
The present Court’s assumption that suppression inflicts substantial
costs, by weakening our ability to impose criminal punishment, is of course
the polar opposite of the Brandeis view that it is the failure to suppress that
will breed lawlessness. As an a priori matter, neither view is intrinsically
implausible. But the empirical research canvassed here has direct relevance
for this debate. And those studies provide compelling support for the
Brandeis insight on which the exclusionary rule originally rested. Indeed,
107

Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109
Hudson, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (acknowledging that “[e]xpansive dicta in
Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the exclusionary rule”).
110
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
112
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
108
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Justice Brandeis’s reasoning presciently expresses the best current
understanding of the connections between legitimacy, procedural justice,
and the control of crime.
As we have developed in detail throughout this Article, the research
regularly finds that people comply with the law not primarily because of
fear of sanctions but rather because they believe that authorities that have
legitimacy should be obeyed. And such legitimacy flows from people’s
confidence that officials are trustworthy, that they abide by the law, and that
they treat citizens with respect. 113 Official disregard for the law—made
evident when misconduct can be openly exploited to prosecutorial
advantage in court—is the kind of behavior that, the research establishes,
tends to weaken perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with law
enforcement.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule sometimes suggest that the notion
of “judicial integrity” argues against suppression of illegally seized
evidence. Contrary to Justice Brandeis, they insist that because suppression
can allow obviously guilty defendants to go free, it undermines public
confidence in the criminal justice system. 114 The legitimacy research has
not tested this sort of claim in the specific context of the exclusionary rule.
But the general question this argument poses—whether legitimacy is
shaped more strongly by police effectiveness than by procedural justice—
has been studied in depth across a wide variety of law enforcement
situations. 115 And the findings are consistent: in virtually every context
studied to date, law enforcement effectiveness has displayed at best only a
weak influence on perceived legitimacy, while procedural justice concerns
are strongly linked to legitimacy, voluntary compliance, and willingness to
cooperate. 116
Against this background, relaxation of the exclusionary rule represents
a direct assault on the capacity of our law enforcement system to succeed in
its mission of maintaining social order. To be sure, a prosecutor’s ability to
use illegally seized evidence increases her capacity to secure a conviction
and a long sentence, an unequivocal crime control benefit if viewed strictly
113

See supra text at notes 50–55.
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2513 (1996) (describing this
argument and its role in the development of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule).
115
See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 46; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47;
Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58.
116
See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 46, at 59 (linking procedural justice
concerns to compliance); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 47, at 251 tbl.3 (linking procedural
justice concerns to cooperation); Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58, at 380 (linking
procedural justice concerns to cooperation).
114
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in the short term. But the strong and consistent finding of the relevant
research is that the net effect of law enforcement disregard for the law is
likely to be the opposite, because judicial tolerance for Fourth Amendment
violations will generate disrespect for authority, chill voluntary compliance,
and discourage law-abiding citizens from offering the cooperation that
makes it possible to apprehend and convict other offenders in future
cases. 117
Controlling ordinary crime and controlling police misconduct thus are
closely connected. And if we are to succeed at both, procedural justice
concerns must be placed at the center of attention.
C. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM

Terrorism is generally considered a problem to be distinguished from
ordinary wrongdoing. Like efforts to combat drug trafficking and some
forms of organized crime, preventing terrorist attacks requires close
attention to international linkages, and federal enforcement agencies take
the lead. Yet terrorism differs significantly from other sorts of transnational
criminality. Its motivations are usually political rather than financial, its
potential for social harm is vastly greater, and its connections to foreign
policy and armed conflict are more prominent. Partly for those reasons, the
structure of law enforcement is distinctive. Local policing is sometimes
relegated to an afterthought; the federal government is expected to play, and
does play, an overwhelmingly dominant role.118
In light of these contrasts, the applicability of the procedural justice
approach to counterterrorism can hardly be taken for granted. Yet criminal
justice theory and the dynamics of terrorism both suggest that this model
has powerful relevance. And as we discuss below, the empirical research
specific to this context, though less comprehensive than that in the area of
ordinary crime, confirms its importance at all levels, from grand strategy in
the federal agencies to the daily behavior of the cop on the beat.
117
See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 39, at 538 (finding that desired cooperation occurs only
when police build community “understanding, trust and respect”); Tyler, Legitimacy, supra
note 49, at 379–80 (police effectiveness is much less important than perceived legitimacy in
predicting willingness to cooperate); Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 58, at 380 tbl.1
(finding perceived effectiveness of police has no significant correlation with willingness to
cooperate, but that procedural justice concerns are strongly correlated with willingness to
cooperate).
118
See, e.g., David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 635, 669 (2005) (describing factors that prompt federal institutions to take lead); Dafna
Linzer, In New York, a Turf War in the Battle Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, Mar. 24,
2008, at A1 (describing FBI reluctance to cede responsibilities to New York City Police
Department). But see Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1715 (2010) (arguing that local police must play significant role).

2011]

AMERICAN POLICING AT A CROSSROADS

365

Start at the place that usually gets the least attention—local policing.
Despite the widespread assumption of federal primacy, law enforcement
officials increasingly recognize that local police must play a significant
role. Collaboration has even been channeled through formal institutions
such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces and “fusion centers.” 119
In part, the growing involvement of local police flows from perceived
changes to the nature of the terrorist challenge. In the aftermath of the
September 2001 attacks, the threat was perceived as a largely foreignsource affair. The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate played down
terrorist threats of domestic origin and identified the growing strength of al
Qaeda in western Pakistan as the principal danger to the United States.120
In late 2009, this perception began to change with a series of allegations
concerning terrorism conspiracies developed within the United States. 121
The 2010 National Security Strategy warned that “recent incidences of
violent extremists in the United States” demonstrate “the threat to the
United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home.” 122
Of 202 people charged with serious terrorist crimes since September 11,
2001, more than half have been U.S. citizens, and over one-third of those
have been American-born. 123
These new threats give local law enforcement increased prominence,
but its importance is now acknowledged even in connection with dangers
emanating abroad. A recent RAND Corporation report, drawing from
global counterterrorism experiences, notes that terrorism is largely a
policing problem, not a military matter, because local police are best able to

119
See JOHN ROLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., NO. RL34070, FUSION CENTERS:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (updated Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf.
120
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 5 (2007). The National Intelligence Estimate summarizes
“the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national
security issues . . . .” Id. at 2.
121
These conspiracies included the decision of a Somali-American to travel to Somalia
and become the first American suicide bomber, the July 2009 arrest of seven North Carolina
Muslims on allegations they intended to commit suicide attacks, the September 2009 arrest
of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi based on allegations that he intended to attack the New York
subway system, the October 2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David Headley in connection
with the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the May 2010 attempt by Pakistani-born American
citizen Faisal Shahzad to explode a car bomb in New York’s Times Square. See JEROME P.
BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., AMERICAN JIHADIST
TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 74–76, 79, 81–82, 86–91 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf; Karen J. Greenberg, Homegrown: The Rise of
American Jihad, NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 2010, at 6, 7.
122
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19 (May 2010).
123
Greenberg, supra note 121, at 6–7.
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build relationships with the communities in which terrorists try to hide and
recruit members. The report urges police to “actively encourage and
cultivate cooperation by building stronger ties with community
leaders . . . .” 124 Another RAND report observes that “state and local law
enforcement agencies . . . may be uniquely positioned to augment federal
intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every
American community [and] their knowledge of local individuals and
groups . . . .” 125 These conclusions are consonant with a broader stream of
thought that understands global terrorism as a form of “insurgency” most
easily defeated by winning the loyalty of the communities in which
terrorists may be found. 126 Even in foreign theaters of military operation,
heavy firepower, though still favored by some, 127 is increasingly deemphasized in favor of at least partial reliance upon measures akin to
domestic policing. 128
Local police thus play a crucial role by virtue of their familiarity with
neighborhoods and their ability to elicit information held within domestic
communities.
And with counterterrorism as with policing against
conventional crime, community cooperation is essential if the police are to
perform this role successfully. Moreover, as with traditional policing,
cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, cooperation may be even
more fragile in the context of counterterrorism than in ordinary law
enforcement: Law-abiding members of the relevant community, though
unswervingly loyal to the United States, know that cooperation could mean
exposing people with whom they share close ethnic and religious ties to
unusually harsh procedures and sanctions. Shaping sound policy to
navigate these sensibilities is thus vitally important but exceptionally
delicate.
Law enforcement agencies, however, do not follow a unified approach.
The decision to opt for policing rather than a military model leaves open
124

SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR
COUNTERING AL QA’IDA 27 (2008).
125
K. JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM ix
(2005); accord Gary LaFree & James Hendrickson, Build a Criminal Justice Policy for
Terrorism, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783 (2007) (“In many ways the communityoriented approach favored by successful police departments is the same kind of approach
that is most likely to uncover terrorist operations.”).
126
See, e.g., DAVID KILCULLEN, COUNTERINSURGENCY 3–5 (2010).
127
See supra text at notes 28–29 (discussing commentators who urge the U.S. to make
greater use of air power against the Taliban, even at the risk of extensive civilian casualties).
128
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, MARINE
CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL xxv
(2007) (noting that “the civilian population [is] . . . the deciding factor in the struggle,” with
the key issue being the ability to secure their support).
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important choices. One is whether to focus on intrusive enforcement and
intelligence-gathering methods that promise instrumental gains (at possible
cost to perceived legitimacy), or whether instead to emphasize long-term
efforts to build community trust. Second, where priority is given to the
objectives of trust and cooperation, should those goals be pursued primarily
by a “top down” approach (building ties to community leaders, as
recommended in the RAND report 129), or should officials emphasize a
“bottom up” policy stressing the quality of interaction with individuals in
ordinary street-level encounters?
In Dearborn, Michigan, which has an Arab-American community of
200,000, law enforcement has made the maintenance of good police–
community relations a “major concern.” 130 In other cities, relations
between Muslim-American communities and local police departments are
strained. 131 At the federal level, community outreach has not been
ignored, 132 but policy has been dominated by measures that relax procedural
restraints on investigation and detention while expanding substantive
criminal offenses to reach behavior with only tenuous connections to acts of
violence. 133 From the general public to many of our highest officials, it is
often considered self-evident that tougher measures will pay greater
dividends. 134 In Britain, in contrast, those who lead the counterterrorism
effort often stress that success depends on building community trust by
adhering to traditional conceptions of due process. 135 In short, no unified
129
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approach to counterterrorism policing has emerged. Instead, officials
commonly emphasize intrusive or coercive tactics without examining their
collateral costs, or focus on generating cooperative relationships with
Muslim community leaders while neglecting the character of daily
interactions at the grassroots. A central concern is the need to determine
which approaches yield the best results in terms of security.
The available empirical evidence offers stark warnings about the
potentially counterproductive effects of harsh measures. A study of British
counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six highvisibility crackdown initiatives, only one had an observable deterrent
effect. 136 Two others had no statistically significant impact, while two
intrusive policies were associated with significant increases in violence. 137
The researchers hypothesized that erroneous arrests and the adoption of
internment without trial contributed to this backlash by undermining the
legitimacy of anti-terrorism efforts. 138 Similarly, studies have found that
of counterterrorism in London’s Metropolitan Police, that “[for] deeply pragmatic
reasons, . . . it is absolutely essential to adhere to due process . . . . People . . . must have
confidence and trust in the authorities . . . . They must believe . . . that information . . . will
not be used . . . to stigmatize their communities or to justify extrajudicial action”). For an
assessment suggesting mixed results from British efforts to build community trust through its
“Prevent” program, see HOUSE OF COMMONS, CMTYS. & LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE,
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
3–4
(Mar.
30, 2010),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf; Vikram
Dodd, Communities Fear Project Is Not What It Seems, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct 17, 2010,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/16/prevent-counter-islamic
-extremism-intelligence.
Responding to such concerns (among others), the British government has proposed to roll
back many powers granted since September 11, 2001; the authority to detain terrorism
suspects for up to twenty-eight days prior to charge would be reduced to fourteen days.
Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2011, H.C. Bill [146] cl. 57, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2010-2011/0146/2011146.pdf.
The
proposal regarding pre-charge detention reflects concerns that the extended power is
unnecessary and “has a negative impact on Muslim communities.” HM GOVERNMENT,
REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS: REVIEW FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2011), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/
counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/review-findings-and-rec?view=Binary.
136
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Id. at 32–34. The sixth intervention studied by LaFree, et al. involved a shift from
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terrorists as ordinary criminal suspects in an effort to delegitimate their cause. The detainees
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context.
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perceived injustice on the part of U.S. forces in Iraq is a strong predictor of
support for resistance there. 139
Turning to counterterrorism tactics in the American domestic context,
many thoughtful scholars have suggested that the heightened threat
environment post-9/11 may justify wider use of ethnic profiling 140 and other
enhanced police powers, such as greater ability to establish roadblocks and
checkpoints. 141 Yet we have already noted the potential negative impact of
such policing activities; in the context of ordinary law enforcement, zerotolerance measures have often backfired, encouraging crime and
discouraging cooperation by creating resentment in minority
communities. 142 A similar problem could well defeat efforts to augment
counterterrorism powers. Indeed, because terrorism is a relatively dispersed
and infrequent phenomenon, posing a threat to a near-infinite range of
symbolic targets and typically using operatives with no prior record of
terrorist activity, accurate and timely information to separate genuine
threats from background noise has enormous value.
Community
cooperation therefore assumes even greater than usual importance. To the
extent that terrorist groups seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist
communities, cooperation can provide information at lower cost and with
fewer negative side effects than coercive or intrusive forms of intelligence
gathering.
That said, we cannot assume that findings from ordinary law
enforcement will apply in a straightforward way to counterterrorism
policing. Because terrorism is motivated by ideology rather than desire for
material gain, co-religionists or members of the same ethnic community
may share some ideological perspectives with those who plan acts of terror.
As a result, law-abiding individuals may be reluctant to put politically
radical members of their communities at risk, even when they themselves
oppose violence. In addition, because al Qaeda invokes religious
justifications for its goals and methods, the religiosity of law-abiding
Muslims could conceivably alter the importance of procedural justice for
securing their cooperation. Finally, because links between procedural
justice and willingness to comply or cooperate have not been found in all
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See, e.g., Ronald Fischer, et al., Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students, 30
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2008).
140
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societies, 143 recent Muslim immigrants who have lived under repressive
governments could conceivably have different notions of legitimacy or its
importance for cooperation.
To test the links between legitimacy, procedural fairness, and
cooperation in communities impacted by counterterrorism enforcement, we
conducted extensive interviews and random polling of Muslim-American
residents of New York City. 144 We found little evidence that religiosity,
cultural differences, or political background play a significant role in
determining willingness to cooperate. The same is true for strength of
identification with the Muslim community; disagreement with American
government policies on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel; and instrumental
concerns such as a belief that the police are effective. 145 In contrast, as in
the case of conventional law enforcement, we found a strong association
between willingness to cooperate with anti-terrorism policing and
perceptions of procedural justice. 146
One way to test the force of these relationships is to look separately at
groups that have particular views about law enforcement or terrorism. For
example, people who consider the terror threat very serious presumably will
be much more willing to cooperate and their willingness might not be
affected so much by whether they think police actions are intrusive or
procedurally irregular. Likewise, people who consider the police effective
and people who are inclined to defer to authority presumably will be willing
to cooperate and again their willingness might not be affected so much by
whether they think police practices are fair.
To look at those possibilities, we divided our sample into people who
think that the terror threat is serious (or not), people who think the police
are effective (or not), and likewise for the other pairs of attitudes. Table 1
below, drawn from the New York City data, shows these relationships.
Part of what Table 1 shows is not surprising. Among people who
think the terror threat is not serious, willingness to cooperate is reduced
substantially by perceptions that the police use intrusive tactics, target
minorities, or act unfairly. We see roughly the same effect for the negative
alternative in the case of each of the other prior attitudes as well. In other
words, among people who can be considered law enforcement skeptics
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Table 1
Relationships Within Prior-Attitude Subgroups:
Police Behavior and Perceived Procedural Justice as
Correlated to Muslim-American Willingness to Cooperate
Prior
Attitudes

Public/Clandestine
Police Action

Police Targeting
of Minorities

Procedural Justice
of the Police

Terror Is Serious
No

-.26***

-.21***

.37***

Yes

-.08***

-.23***

.40***

Police Are Effective
No

-.18***

-.12***

.41***

Yes

-.02***

-.11***

.26***

Police Help You Feel Safe
No

-.19***

-.13***

.36***

Yes

-.07***

-.10***

.49***

Preference for Law Enforcement Authority
No

-.20***

-.20***

.41***

Yes

-.09***

-.10***

.29***

Respect for Hierarchy
Low

-.27***

-.20***

.40***

High

-.13***

-.11***

.33***

* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.
(Entries are subgroup correlations with a combined
measure of legitimacy and cooperation.)
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(people who prefer liberty to order, reject hierarchies, and think the police
are not effective), cooperation drops substantially when police are perceived
as intrusive or unfair. These are largely the results we would expect, but
they underscore the importance of fairness for cooperation among a
substantial segment of the population.
When we look at the lower row of each pair, those who think terrorism
is a serious problem and generally favor law enforcement authority, we see
in column 1 that cooperation is not affected by the use of intrusive tactics.
These people seem more focused on instrumental payoffs than on
legitimacy. They are generally willing to accept intrusive tactics when they
accept hierarchical authority and consider the police effective.
But two relationships are less predictable. First, even when these
respondents consider the terror threat very serious, cooperation drops
substantially if they believe the police are targeting people in their
community. And second, in the lower row of all of these pairs (i.e., among
those who broadly support law enforcement), column 3 shows that
cooperation drops substantially, with very high statistical significance,
when police use unfair procedures, such as stopping people without
explanation, denying them any opportunity to be heard, and failing to treat
them with courtesy. In other words, for all of these subgroups, regardless
of prior attitudes about the police, civil liberties, and so on, perceptions of
procedural justice have a major impact on willingness to cooperate.
We can illustrate the concrete impact of these relationships by
separating the respondents into quartiles based on the extent to which they
saw the police as respecting (or not respecting) the requirements of
procedural justice. We can then focus on willingness to cooperate within
each group. By highlighting the differences between the groups, Tables 2
and 3 illustrate the consequences of failing to nurture perceptions of
procedural fairness.
These tables show in more tangible terms the impact of procedural
justice on cooperation. Table 2 focuses on perceived fairness in
establishing counterterrorism policies. When people believe that overall
policies are established fairly, willingness to work with the police rises by
11%, and even more strikingly, willingness to report suspicious activity
rises by 61%. That 61% figure is an increase of enormous significance for
successful intelligence gathering: Fairness in establishing policies makes it
61% more likely that people in this community will be willing to report
suspicious behavior.
Table 3 shifts the focus to perceived fairness in enforcement. When
people believe that policies are fairly implemented, willingness to report
suspicious activity increases by 41% and willingness to work with the
police increases by 62%.
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Table 2
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans
Percent of Each Quartile Willing to:

Belief That Policy is
Created Fairly

n

Very Low

71

82%

49%

Medium Low

69

78%

66%

Medium High

83

88%

67%

Very High

68

91%

79%

Difference

Work With Police

+9 pts (+ 11%)

Alert Police

+30 pts (+61%)

(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in policy creation.)

Table 3
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans
Percent of Each Quartile Willing to:

Belief That Policy is
Enforced Fairly

n

Very Low

71

39%

41%

Medium Low

69

43%

43%

Medium High

83

51%

57%

Very High

68

63%

58%

Difference

Work With Police

+24 pts (+ 62%)

Alert Police

+17 pts (+41%)

(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in enforcement.)

One somewhat unexpected finding is that willingness to work with
police in anti-terror initiatives is only modestly affected by fairness in the
formation of policy but is extremely sensitive to fairness in enforcement. In
contrast, willingness to alert the police decreases in response to both sorts
of unfairness, but in the reverse order: it is much more sensitive to whether
overall policies are established fairly. We suspect that because working
with the police is local and personal, willingness to do so is more strongly
driven by the trustworthiness of officials nearby than by large questions of
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policy, such as the decision whether to maintain a detention camp at
Guantánamo Bay. Conversely, willingness to report suspicious activity
seems more likely to be affected by respondents’ perceptions of overall
systemic fairness: how such information will be processed by higher
officials and how fairly suspects will be treated once they come to law
enforcement attention. If so, it makes sense that willingness to report
would be very sensitive to perceived fairness of the system as a whole but
less affected by respondents’ trust in officials with whom they and their
neighbors interact in the neighborhood.
Dynamics of this sort can of course be explored in considerably greater
detail. But the existing research is already ample to establish our two
central points. First, apart from any civil liberties considerations, tough
measures that skirt traditional conceptions of due process take a substantial
toll on law enforcement effectiveness. And second, procedural justice
concerns accordingly should be allotted a central place in all efforts to
design and implement counterterrorism policy. As in other contexts,
sensitivity to procedural justice serves to promote rather than impair the
security effort.
V. CONCLUSION
This is an ideal moment to reconsider the principles that guide
American policing. If we can adopt policing styles that communicate
respect and nurture public trust, we can address the central concerns of both
minority and majority populations.
Research consistently shows that whites and minorities want the same
thing from the police: fair treatment. Minorities are, however, more apt to
say that historically they have been treated unfairly and that they do not
receive fair treatment even now. This perceived unfairness leads to lower
legitimacy ratings, less deference to the law among minorities, and lower
levels of cooperation with the police.
Addressing these concerns involves reframing the way we think about
the goals of policing, in the context of both counterterrorism and ordinary
law enforcement. At all levels, government agencies must pay attention to
public judgments about how they exercise their authority because such
judgments shape the behaviors that are of primary importance to the police,
in particular the willingness of individuals to obey the law and their
willingness to cooperate in efforts to enforce the law against others.

